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BENCH AND BAR
THE POWER OF A WEST VIRGINIA CORPORATION TO
DEPRIVE CLASSES OF ITS STOCK OF THE
RIGHT TO VOTE FOR THE ELECTION
OF DIRECTORS OR MANAGERS
Air. Burdett of the student board of editors of the West
Virginia Law Quarterly, in a note published in the June 1933
issue of that journal, cites as authority for the constitutionality
of section 22, article 1, chapter 30 of the Revised Code the report
of the commission lately charged with revising and codifying the
laws of the state of West Virginia.
As chairman of that commission, I think I speak for all of
the members who participated in the work, in disclaiming all
responsibility for any such interpretation of section 4, of article
XI of the Constitution of West Virginia, which is as follows:
"The legislature shall provide by law that in all elections
for directors or managers of incorporated companies, every
stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person or by
proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by him, for
as many persons as there are directors or managers to be
elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate
as many votes as the number of directors multiplied by the
number of his shares of stock, shall equal, or to distribute
them on the same principle among as many candidates as he
shall think fit; and such directors or managers shall not be
elected in any other manner."
This section became a part of the constitution in 1872. With
the exception of the name of the legislative body, which in Illinois
is designated the "general assembly" and in West Virginia the
"legislature", the provision is copied literally from the constitution of the state of Illinois, even to the extent of inserting the
punctuation marks. It first appeared in the constitution of
Illinois adopted in 1870.
The legislature of West Virginia, session 1872-3, authorized
corporations chartered in the state to issue preferred stock,
authorizing in unrestricted terms the creation of such preference
and the imposing of such restrictions on such shares as might
seem advisable. The legislative act mentioned did not expressly
confer upon corporations the power to deprive the owner of any
class of shares of the right to vote, but, nevertheless, the practice
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arose soon after the adoption of the constitution of 1872, of chartering West Virginia corporations with authority to issue preferred shares, by the terms of which they were deprived of the
right to vote at any meeting of the stockholders. The legislature
in the session of 1901, chapter 35, section 5, expressly authorized
the chartering of corporations with authority to issue preferred
shares without voting rights. This act merely gave legislative
sanction to a practice that had prevailed from 1872 to 1901.
In the work of the code commission the members of that body
were confronted with the constitutional provision referred to and
the act of 1901 which was apparently in plain disregard of the
constitutional inhibition, and conditions of business affairs in
West Virginia arising out of the fact that during the period of
more than fifty years the administrative officers of the state had
issued charterg in which corporations were authorized to issue preferred non-voting shares. It was then and is now apparent that
some confusion, the avoidance of which is probably desirable,
would arise from changing the statute to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted.
In order to avoid the disturbance to business which would
result from upsetting the practice of more than fifty years, the
members of the code commission carried into their report the provisions of the act of 1901, but attempted to limit strictly the departure from the constitutional provision to that which had the
sanction of legislative action and of fifty years practice. A
thorough investigation of the decisions of courts interpreting
similar constitutional provisions convinced the members of the
commission that the weight of judicial opinion would hold as unconstitutional the West Virginia act of 1901.
We studied with considerable misgiving the well-reasoned
cases of the People v, Emmerson,1 decided by the supreme court
of Illinois in 1922; Brooks v. The State,' decided by the supreme
court of Delaware in 1911; and Randle v. Winona Coal Company,'
decided by the supreme court of Alabama in 1921.
Mr. Justice Woolley, later Chief Justice of Delaware, and
still later an able judge of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Justice Carter of the Supreme
Court of Illinois, answered in ihe negative every proposition which
IU. 300, 134 N. E. 707, 21 A. L. R. 636.
3 Boyce 1, 79 AtI. 790.
2206 Ala. 254, 89 So. 790.
1302
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was or apparently could be asserted in favor of the constitutionality of legislative action of the respective states similar to the
West Virginia act of 1901, in the face of the constitutional inhibition in the state of Illinois identical, and in the state of Delaware,
almost identical, with the provision in West Virginia. The courts
of those states were not influenced by an business consideration,
or obligation to prevent confusion in business affairs, or by any
question of public policy. Indeed, they held that in the matter
of public policy the rule clearly favored the right to give to every
shareholder of a corporation one vote for each share of stock
held.
The supreme court of Missouri, in the case of Frank v.
Swanger,' decided in 1905, upheld the right of the legislature to
authorize the issuing of non-voting preferred stock by a Missouri
corporation under a constitutional provision somewhat similar to
but not identical with the constitutional provision of West
Virginia.
The members of the commission anticipated that the West
Virginia court might follow that of Missouri, and in that event
they desired to buttress such decision with an express legislative
interpretation of section 4, of article XI of the constitution of the
state. With that object in view we appended to the section in
question, in our report, the following note:
"The provisions of see. 16, c. 53, Code 1923, authorizing
the issuing of classes of preferred stock without, or with
limited, voting rights are retained in this section. The weight
of modern judicial opinion seems to hold such a provision
unconstitutional, but these decisions, while well reasoned in
many respects, seem to ignore the flexibility of a state constitution to meet changing public conditions, and for this
reason do not seem to give as much weight as we think should
be given to the real purpose of the provision which was to
secure the right of cumulative voting. It is thought if its
true weight is given the purpose in mind, and the flexibility
of state constitutions to meet changing public conditions is
not forgotten, that the provision respecting preferred stock
is constitutional, especially where there has been a long existing legislative policy in harmony with this statute, which
has induced many corporations to adopt its provisions. Attention is also called to the fact that the constitutional provision referred to relates only to voting for directors, and
does not relate to the right to vote on other corporate

acts."
'190 Mo. 561, 89 S. W. 872, 4 Ann. Cas. 563.
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In the note quoted we expressly recognize the weight of
judicial authority to be against the constitutionality of the West
Virginia act of 1901 which was carried into the revision. At the
same time we give a plausible reason so far as able why the supreme
court of this state might give judicial sanction to the interpretation of the constitutional provision given by a legislative act and
fifty years of application by the administrative officers of the
state.
However, the report of the code commission carrying into the
revision the provisions of the act of the legislature of 1901 was
not adopted by the legislative committee or the legislature, but
instead the provisions of a recent Delaware statute were bodily
inserted in the West Virginia code. If the legislature had set out
with the sole object of disregarding all constitutional obligations
assumed by its members and defying the provisions of the section
of the constitution quoted, language more apt for the purpose
than that adopted could not have been found.
"Every corporation, other than a banking institution,
shall have power to issue one or more classes of stock or one
or more series of stock within any class thereof, any or all
of which classes may be of stock with par value or stock without par value, with such voting powers, full or limited, or
without voting powers and in such series and with such
designations, preferences and relative, participating, optional or other special rights, and qualifications, limitations or
restrictions thereof, as shall be stated and expressed in the
charter, or in any amendment thereto, or in the resolution or
resolutions providing for the issue of such stock adopted by
the board of directors pursuant to authority expressly vested
in it by the provisions of the charter or of any amendment
thereto. The power to increase or decrease or otherwise adjust the capital stock as in this chapter elsewhere provided
shall apply to all or any of such classes of stock. Any preferred or special stock may be made subject to redemption
at such time or times and at such price or prices and may
be issued in such series, participating, optional or other special
rights, and qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof as
shall be stated and expressed in the charter, or in any amendment thereto, or in the resolution or resolutions providing for
the issue of such stock adopted by the board of directors as
hereinabove provided."
This provision copied from the Delaware statutes is authority
for every corporate abuse which justly casts obloquy upon the
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legislature and courts of Delaware. Of course, no such provision
could have been written into the Delaware statutes under the constitution of that state effective at the time of the decision to which
we have referred. All constitutional restrictions on the power of
the legislature to create corporations had been removed by amendment prior to the passage of the Delaware statute. It is hardly
necessary for us to say that we believe the West Virginia statute
quoted to be in violation of the state constitution and constitutional authority. Keeping in mind that article 4 of section XI of the
Constitution of West Virginia under elemental rules of law is as
much a part of every charter issued by the state of West Virginia
as if set out and written verbatim on the face of the charter, we
cannot think it possible that a court in West Virginia would uphold this statute. Indeed, a decision of the West Virginia court
upholding the statute could afford but little assurance to those
subsequently relying upon its constitutionality. Any such must
at all times have before them the probability that a court at a later
date better advised would hold that any such interpretation was
not and never had been the law of the state of West Virginia as
written in its constitution.
Justice Woolley perhaps gave the only excuse that any court
will be able to give for the adoption of the West Virginia statute.
In discussing the constitutionality of an act of the legislature of
Delaware much less flagrant in its disregard of the supreme law
of that state, he said:
"The general corporation law that was enacted subsequently to the adoption of the constitution of 1897, under the
terms of which the preferred stock of George Brooks & Son
Company was deprived of voting power, must have been enacted in ignorance of the constitutional provision then existing. is
-Mhvn G. SPERR.Y.
Brooks v. The State, supra n. 2, at 79 AtI. 801.
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